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Abstract
With public services such as health and education, it is not straightforward for con-
sumers to assess the quality of provision. Many such services are provided by monopoly
not-for-profit providers and there is concern that for-profit providers may increase profit at
the expense of quality. This paper explores the implications of entry by for-profit providers
when there is unobserved quality. The model generates three key policy-relevant insights.
First, by developing a novel approach to competition between different organizational
forms, it frames the relevant trade-offs precisely. Second, it shows the value of keeping
an incumbent not-for-profit as an active provider. Third, it characterizes the optimal pay-
ment (or voucher value) to an entrant for each consumer who switches in a way that can be
applied empirically.
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1 Introduction
When it comes to public services such as education and health care, much of the economy is
run by not-for-profit providers. There is widespread suspicion that quality of public services
(some aspects of which are not easily observed) will suffer if supplied by for-profit providers,
even if they are more cost efficient, which can be avoided by having those services supplied by
monopoly state-funded not-for-profit providers. This would be fine except that such providers
can be problematic not least because, as monopoly providers, they have little incentive to be
responsive to customer needs. There may, moreover, be potential entrants who can provide the
service at lower cost. These concerns notwithstanding, allowing a greater role for for-profit
provision is among the most controversial proposals in public service reform.
This paper provides a window on this policy debate by exploring the implications of en-
try by for-profit providers in a world where the principal drawback from for-profit provision
is a failure to provide an unobserved dimension of quality. Following Glaeser and Shleifer
(2001), this drawback can be mitigated by using a not-for-profit provider even if the latter
does not necessarily act in the best interest of consumers. Entry by a for-profit provider nev-
ertheless guarantees that consumers are better off, despite the unobserved quality, provided
that the not-for-profit incumbent is retained as an active provider — the for-profit provider sup-
plies markedly (not just marginally) higher observed quality to offset lower unobserved quality.
Keeping the not-for-profit incumbent active also ensures that consumers who do not switch to
an entrant do not lose out. But a for-profit entrant competing with a not-for-profit incumbent
needs a greater cost advantage for entry to be worthwhile than if the incumbent were for-profit.
This creates a trade-off from retaining the not-for-profit incumbent: it ensures greater benefit
to consumers if entry occurs but with a lower probability of benefit-increasing entry. Entry
by another not-for-profit provider, however, can occur with a smaller cost advantage relative
to the not-for-profit incumbent, which may be why much competition in education and health
services is by not-for-profit providers.
Having explored the potential for for-profit provision to benefit consumers, we explore
whether it is optimal for the government to set a capitation fee (in effect a voucher) that dis-
criminates for or against the incumbent. In general, it is not optimal for there to be a “level
playing field” with the same capitation fee for both because the probability of entry is endoge-
nous to the fee that is set. We give conditions for the capitation fee for the entrant to be above
or below that for the incumbent and also show that the factors that go into this formula can in
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principal be measured.
The analysis of this paper generates three key policy-relevant insights. First, by developing
a novel approach to competition between different organizational forms, in particular what hap-
pens when a for-profit and a not-for-profit compete, it frames the relevant trade-offs precisely.
Second, it shows that the value of keeping an incumbent not-for-profit active as a competitor is
relevant for policy discussions about opening up public services to competition. Third, it char-
acterizes the optimal level of the fee or voucher value to an entrant for each switching consumer
in a way that can be applied empirically.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss related litera-
ture. Section 3 introduces the core modeling framework. It also sets up the monopoly bench-
mark and motivates the role for not-for-profit provision in that framework. Section 4 allows
entry and studies competition with different provider objectives. Section 5 develops the anal-
ysis of optimal funding, including the optimal capitation fee or voucher that should be offered
for consumers who move to an entrant. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains proofs of
propositions. Appendix B shows that the main results are robust to allowing for a more general
objective function for not-for-profit firms, a continuous distribution of switching costs/benefits
for consumers and multiple quality dimensions.
2 Related Literature
The model of not-for-profit provision we use draws on two established approaches. From New-
house (1970), we use the idea that not-for-profit providers have a bias towards quality relative
to for-profit providers and, following Hansmann (1980), we acknowledge the importance of the
difficulties in monitoring performance in understanding why firms choose not-for-profit status.
Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) have a formal model with non-contractible quality in which not-for-
profit providers choose higher levels of quality than for-profit providers solely because of the
non-distribution constraint that applies to not-for-profits, not because of an inherent preference
for higher quality. They also briefly discuss competition between for-profit and not-for-profit
providers but without two characteristics common to many public services, that consumers do
not pay directly for them and that strategic interaction between providers plays a role when, as
with schools and hospitals, location is important to consumers. Non-contractibility of quality
also lies behind the core trade-offs uncovered by Hart et al (1997) in their model of public ver-
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sus private ownership of a public service facility. The literature has observed that the potential
cost-quality trade-off can be mitigated by employing motivated agents who care directly about
quality, as in Besley and Ghatak (2001), Francois (2007), Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008)
and Ghatak and Mueller (2011).
There are obvious difficulties in comparing the extent to which for-profit and not-for-profit
providers differ in delivery of quality dimensions unobserved by customers — as noted in
Glaeser and Shleifer (2001, footnote 10), such quality dimensions are typically unobserved by
researchers too. Sloan (2000) assesses the reasons, including difficulties in measuring qual-
ity among others, why not-for-profit provision is dominant in US healthcare. More recently,
Herrera et al (2014) provide an overview of the findings of numerous systematic reviews of
differences between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals in a variety of settings. While ex-
pressing concern about the methodological quality of many of those reviews, they still con-
clude that, among private providers, for-profits have significantly higher mortality rates than
not-for-profits. While differences in mortality rates are observable ex post, they may well be
something patients are unaware of at the time of choosing where to go for treatment.
The role of competition in public service provision has been discussed in Le Grand (2007).
Hoxby (1999) has discussed some formal models of how competition can matter. Lakdawalla
and Philipson (2006) also discusses competition with a not-for-profit provider. In that model,
a not-for-profit differs from a for-profit only in having the quantity it provides as an argument
in its objective function in addition to, and separate from, its role in generating profit. Only
because charitable donations enable it to operate at a loss can it indulge its own preferences
relative to a for-profit provider with the same cost function. Quality of service does not enter
the model. More recently, Laine and Ma (2017) include quality of service in their model of
competition between public and private firms. Their public firms, however, are assumed to
maximize social surplus, which makes them very different from the not-for-profit providers in
Newhouse (1970) and in Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) that have their own self interests.
The analysis of competition and entry in education is extensive. In its early incarnation,
the focus was on competition between jurisdictions with population mobility. However, in
recent years interest has been fuelled in large measure by the US charter school experiment
allowing entry of schools to compete against public providers. The latter has been taken up
in a range of countries including Sweden and the UK. There is now a large theoretical and
empirical literature on the role of competition in improving the performance of schools. From
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the theoretical side, there are contributions by Barseghyan et al (2014), Epple and Romano
(1998) and McMillan (2005). Empirical studies of the impact of school competition include
Card et al (2010), Hoxby (2003), Lavy (2008) and Gibbons et al (2008). However, as yet there
is no canonical theoretical approach to entry in competition with public providers that takes
into account of the possibility of strategic interaction between them.
The paper is also related to the large literature on school vouchers (see Ladd (2002) and Neil
(2002) for reviews) following the early advocacy of the idea by Friedman (1962). Standard
models, such as Nechyba (2000), look at the possibility that a citizen can carry their public
funding to another provider. Böhlmark and Lindahl (2015) evaluate Sweden’s school voucher
system, arguing that increased school competition enhanced standards. The debate about the
value of voucher systems has typically centred on changes in quality and/or the gains from
competition. Here we raise an additional issue — whether vouchers should be more or less
generous than the capitation fee given to incumbents — and show that, because quality may
not be optimal in the first place, there may be a case for either more or less generous funding
of entrants relative to incumbents.
How to ensure service quality is also a major focus of the literature on health care, with
significant implications for public provision of health services, see Chalkley and Malcomson
(2000). The growing literature on the effects of competition on quality in provision of health
services is reviewed in Gaynor et al (2015). The models of quality determination by providers
reviewed there focus on a single quality dimension observed by customers, so there is not the
underlying rationale for not-for-profit providers emphasized in Hansmann (1980), and on mo-
nopolistic competition, in which there is no strategic interaction between providers. Absence of
strategic interaction is appropriate when there is a large number of competitors, none of which
impact more on one rival than on another. In our setting, which begins with a status quo of
a monopoly state-funded incumbent, and more generally where location is important, taking
account of strategic interaction is unavoidable. Brekke et al (2011) and Brekke et al (2012) do
that in studying the effect of competition on quality with not-for-profit providers modeled as
caring about consumer benefits in addition to profit. Brekke et al (2014) consider how patient
mobility affects provision of health care when governments make quality investment decisions
to maximize welfare and study the important question of how this depends on transfer pay-
ments when patients shop around. In these models, however, quality has a single dimension
observable by consumers, so here also there is not the underlying rationale for not-for-profit
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providers emphasized in Hansmann (1980).
The health literature also provides evidence that significant numbers of patients really do
switch providers in response to competition, see Chandra et al (2016) for the US and Gaynor et
al (2016) for the UK. Bloom et al (2015) argue that competition between UK public hospitals
increases the quality of management practices but do not study competition between for-profit
and not-for-profit hospitals.
3 The Model
Set-up The basic model considers provision of a public service for which there is a single
incumbent provider, denoted by I, and a single potential entrant, denoted by E. The service has
two dimensions of quality in amounts q,Q≥ 0, neither of which is contractible. The difference
between them is that providers can commit only to q before consumers, having observed q,
choose which provider to use. In contrast, providers choose Q only after consumers have
chosen where to consume. (An equally good alternative would be that consumers are unable
to observe Q before experiencing it.) We refer to Q as unobservable quality. That dimensions
of quality are unobserved motivates the value of not-for-profit provision in this setting since
for-profit firms have no incentive to provide such quality.
Revenue per customer is fixed at pi ≥ 0, for i ∈ {I,E}, and is funded from taxation. In the
case of entry in education, it can be thought of as a voucher which a consumer can use to spend
the per capita cost of provision with an entrant instead of with the incumbent. In the case of
health, it corresponds to the payment under Medicare per patient in a given diagnosis related
group and to the payment by results for specific treatments under the British National Health
Service. Thus, the model is one of decentralized service provision with centralized finance.1
Unobserved dimensions of quality are a characteristic feature of many public services.
While a parent may be able to see what is on the curriculum that they choose for their child,
whether the teachers are enthusiastic and/or knowledgeable in the subject that they teach cannot
be observed ex ante. Similarly, a patient choosing a hospital may observe the level of cleanli-
ness and possibly even the track-record of the surgeons but will find it difficult to assess what
efforts are put into patient aftercare and “softer” aspects of care such as bedside manner. Fi-
nally, someone who receives legal counsel funded by the state can see what the qualifications
1The model could straightforwardly be extended to allow for a regulated user fee.
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of the lawyer are but not how much time is set aside for such activities and whether it is simply
viewed as a chore by those assigned to such work.
There is a continuum of consumers of the public service, each of whom consumes at most
one unit and from that receives utility Q+ q.2 In the basic model, a proportion 1− γ of con-
sumers are rigid in the sense of always choosing the incumbent provider as long as it offers
utility of at least zero, whereas the remainder are flexible, choosing whichever of the available
providers’ quality bundles yields the higher utility.
Allowing for rigid consumers is a non-standard, but realistic, feature of the set-up. Many
markets for public services opened up to competition have seen quite limited take-up. While
this could be interpreted as consumers being content with the service they are provided, it is
also interpreted as inertia. Inertia could be due to real costs, as when a patient must travel to
receive medical treatment. It could also be psychological, with consumers simply unwilling to
explore alternatives even when it is in their interest to do so. Having two groups of consumers
in our core model simplifies the exposition. In Appendix B, we show that the insights hold in a
more general model with a continuum of switching costs and multiple dimensions of quality.
The cost of providing a unit of the service is [c(Q)+ c(q)]/θi, where c(·) is strictly in-
creasing and strictly convex with c(0) = c′ (0) = 0 and θi ∈
[
θ , θ¯
]
for i ∈ {I,E} an efficiency
parameter that can differ between providers.3 Again Appendix B shows that the core results
hold without making the cost function additive and identical for the two kinds of quality.
We assume that θI is known to policy makers and to any potential entrant. The entrant’s
cost θE is drawn from a distribution G(θE) with support
[
θ , θ¯
]
and continuous density g(θE).
This distribution captures uncertainty about the costs of potential entrants. We let xi ∈ [0,1]
denote provider i’s market share.
For-Profit Provision A for-profit provider’s objective is to maximize
{pi− [c(Q)+ c(q)]/θi}xi,
i.e. the revenue per customer served less the cost of provision, multiplied by its market share.
Consider consumers with best outside option of U (which could be not consuming at all, in
which case U = 0). With Q set only after consumers choose a provider, a for-profit provider
2Having consumers homogeneous in their tastes for quality serves to highlight the role of competition per se,
as distinct from more providers increasing welfare simply by offering greater variety.
3A fixed cost per consumer that is independent of quality can be deducted from revenue in specifying pi.
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will set Q = 0, i.e. it always provides the lowest level of unobservable quality.4 Then observed
quality is set equal to utility, i.e.
q =U. (1)
Profit per consumer at this utility level is therefore
vFPi (U,θi, pi) = pi−
c(U)
θi
. (2)
For the analysis that follows, it is useful to use (2) to define U˜FPi (θi, pi) by
pi =
c
(
U˜FPi (θi, pi)
)
θi
(3)
as the highest utility a for-profit provider with efficiency parameter θi is able to deliver without
making a loss. This plays a key role in the entry analysis below.
Not-for-profit Provision We adopt a reduced-form approach to not-for-profit behaviour in
which the provider cares about quality with objective
(αQ+q)xi. (4)
This behaviour can be derived from the non-distribution constraint that applies to not-for-profit
providers, as in Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) where the provision of unobservable quality is the
sine qua non of not-for-profit status. But it may also arise because the not-for-profit has a direct
preference for quality as in Newhouse (1970).5 We are agnostic about which of these is the
underlying rationale. We are also agnostic about whether α is greater or less than 1, i.e. whether
the not-for-profit values unobservable quality more or less than consumers, though we assume
α 6= 1, because the case in which their interests are perfectly aligned is not very interesting. The
model captures a key delegation problem that typifies public service provision where provider
4Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) allow informally for concern about reputation that results in a for-profit providing
unobservable quality above the minimal level. Here, as there, the essential point is that this is below the level of a
not-for-profit provider, see their Proposition 1.
5The preferences in (4) can be formally underpinned by preferences that are a weighted sum of consumer and
provider interests
[λ (βQ+q)+(1−λ )(Q+q)]xi,
where the parameter λ is the weight a not-for-profit provider puts on its own interests relative to those of consumers
and β reflects the weight it puts on unobservable, relative to observable, quality which may differ from that of
consumers, with α = λβ + (1−λ ). For λ = 0, α = 1 and the provider is fully benevolent in the sense of
maximizing consumer utility.
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interests (for better or worse) play a key role in the way that services are provided. As we show
below, competition can reduce the power of provider interests.
A not-for-profit provider must cover its costs, which gives the breakeven constraint
{pi− [c(Q)+ c(q)]/θi}xi ≥ 0. (5)
This rules out the possibility that it receives donations to support its activities over and above
the publicly funded capitation fee.6 Since it cares directly about both kinds of quality, it chooses
values of {Q,q} to maximize (4) subject to the breakeven constraint (5) and to offering suffi-
cient utility to attract consumers. The first-order conditions for its quality choices for given
market share xi > 0 are
αθi−µc′ (Qi) = 0 and θi−µc′ (qi) = 0, (6)
where µ is a Lagrange multiplier on the breakeven constraint (5).7 Denote the solution by
{Q∗ (α,θi, pi) ,q∗ (α,θi, pi)} and let
U∗(α,θi, pi) = Q∗ (α,θi, pi)+q∗ (α,θi, pi) (7)
denote the resulting level of consumer utility.8 When the best outside option for consumers U
satisfies U ≤U∗ (α,θi, pi), as is the case when there is no entry so U = 0, this is the optimal
solution. Otherwise, the optimal solution is fully determined by the solution with Q≥ q to the
binding utility and breakeven constraints and, hence, the following pair of conditions
Qˆ∗ (U,θi, pi) =U− qˆ∗ (U,θi, pi) (8)
pi =
c(U− qˆ∗ (U,θi, pi))+ c(qˆ∗ (U,θi, pi))
θi
. (9)
Note that Qˆ∗ is strictly positive and depends on U but is independent of α .
6It is straightforward to allow this possibility which is considered by Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006).
7In this context, the solution when Q is chosen after consumers have chosen where to consume in response to
the choice of q, as assumed here, is the same as when Q is chosen simultaneously with q.
8Both Q∗ (α,θi, pi) and q∗ (α,θi, pi) are unique because c(.) is strictly convex and are strictly positive because
c′ (0) = 0.
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Analogous to what we had for a for-profit, define U˜NPi (θi, pi) by
pi =
2c
(
U˜NPi (θi, pi)/2
)
θi
(10)
as the highest utility a not-for-profit provider with efficiency parameter θi can feasibly deliver
given the breakeven constraint, i.e. where q = Q as desired by consumers. For the same effi-
ciency θi, it is immediate that U˜NPi (θi, pi) > U˜
FP
i (θi, pi) because the cost function is strictly
convex and the not-for-profit provider provides both types of quality. Because a not-for-profit
provider’s preferences ensure that it delivers positive unobservable quality, it enjoys an effective
cost advantage.
A not-for-profit provider’s payoff per consumer served is
vNPi (U,θi, pi)
=

αQ∗ (α,θi, pi)+q∗ (α,θi, pi) , if U ∈ [0,U∗(α,θi, pi)];
αQˆ∗ (U,θi, pi)+ qˆ∗ (U,θi, pi) , if U ∈
[
U∗ (α,θi, pi) ,U˜NPi (θi, pi)
]
;
0 , otherwise.
(11)
It is straightforward to check that, for U ∈ [U∗ (α,θi, pi) ,U˜NPi (θi, pi)], vNPi is decreasing in U
and everywhere non-negative, which implies that a not-for-profit provider will always wish to
be active in the market.
Monopoly Benchmark The benchmark for our exercise is an incumbent monopoly provider.
Then the only outside option for consumers is not consuming, for which U = 0. In practice,
monopoly public service provision uses not-for-profit provision and the following result makes
clear why this is the case in our model.9
Proposition 1 With a monopoly provider, the utility it offers consumers is uFP (θI, pI) = 0 for
all (θI, pI) if it is for-profit and uNP (θI, pI) =U∗ (α,θI, pI) > 0 for all (θI, pI) if it is not-for-
profit. The utility U∗ (α,θI, pI) is increasing in θI and pI and decreases as α diverges further
from one.
A monopoly for-profit provider’s only interest is to minimize the cost of provision, so it
offers only the lowest utility for which consumers will seek provision, normalized as zero,
9All proofs are in Appendix A.
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whatever θI and pI are. Thus consumers receive only their reservation payoff and get no gain
from having the service provided, so it is never worthwhile to raise taxes to pay a monopoly
for-profit provider to supply the service. In contrast, a monopoly not-for-profit provider offers
consumer utility U∗ (α,θI, pI) defined in (7) which is strictly greater than zero for all θI and
pI , so consumers are always better off with a monopoly not-for-profit provider, no matter how
inefficient, than with a monopoly for-profit provider.10
Proposition 1 also implies that neither increasing funding (higher pI) nor having a more ef-
ficient provider (higher θI) makes a difference to the quality of service supplied by a monopoly
for-profit provider. In contrast, both are unambiguously better for consumers with a monopoly
not-for-profit provider because they allow more of both kinds of quality to be provided. But
not-for-profit provision does not maximize consumer utility for given funding because, with
α 6= 1, there is non-alignment between the provider’s and consumers’ objectives.
Finally, Proposition 1 shows that consumers will actually be worse off as the objective
function of a not-for-profit provider diverges further away from consumer preferences as rep-
resented by α further away from one. This is an important distortion that motivates a role
for competition beyond achieving cost-efficiency. The rents earned by monopoly not-for-profit
providers are decision rents due to their ability to determine the mix of qualities they prefer.
4 Entry
In this section we explore entry. A natural starting point is a not-for-profit incumbent because,
with monopoly, we have shown that not-for-profit provision is always better. However, we do
not restrict ourselves to that case. In general, entry serves two possible roles. First, an entrant
may be more efficient (have higher θ ). Second, because even a not-for-profit incumbent’s
preferences are not fully aligned with consumer preferences, entry may result in an outcome
that is closer to what (flexible) consumers want.
The timing is as follows:
1. Nature determines the efficiency of the potential entrant θE ∈
[
θ , θ¯
]
which, as well as
being revealed to the potential entrant, is revealed to consumers and to the incumbent
10Although not included formally in our model, this result carries over straightforwardly to the case with a fixed
cost of provision independent of the number of consumers served. If that fixed cost is sufficiently large that the
market can sustain only one provider, it is always better for consumers that this is a not-for-profit provider. This
has a direct policy implication. If a community is too small to sustain more than one school or hospital, it is better
for consumers that the school or hospital is not-for-profit, as historically the case in many places.
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along with the entrant’s type (for-profit or not-for-profit).
2. The potential entrant decides whether to enter and, if it decides to do so, chooses qE ,
which is observed by consumers and the incumbent. (If the entrant anticipates the same
equilibrium payoff from entering as from not entering, it chooses to enter if and only if
it actually attracts some consumers.)
3. The incumbent chooses qI , which is observed by consumers.
4. Consumers choose whether to consume and if so where with, for simplicity, indifferent
flexible consumers choosing the entrant.
5. Provider I chooses QI and provider E, if entered, chooses QE .
In all cases, we follow Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) in assuming that consumers can observe
which kind of provider, for-profit or not-for-profit, that they are consuming with. We solve for
a subgame perfect equilibrium.11
4.1 The Logic of Entry
For each organizational form j ∈ {FP,NP}, u j(θi, pi) specified in Proposition 1 for i ∈ {I,E}
is the utility to consumers delivered by a type j provider if not constrained by competition.
When deciding whether to accommodate entry, the incumbent must decide whether to allow
the entrant to serve the flexible consumers. Whether it does so depends on the difference in its
payoff, whether from profits or as a not-for-profit, from serving the whole market compared to
serving only the proportion (1− γ) consisting of rigid consumers. To serve the whole market,
it must offer all consumers utility that more than matches the utility offered by the entrant.
But if it seeks to retain only the rigid consumers, it can do that by offering just u j(θI, pI) and
thus receive a higher payoff per consumer served. There is thus a critical proportion of flexible
consumers that makes it optimal to compete for them.
Formally, the incumbent’s payoff is (1− γ)v jI (u j(θI, pI),θI, pI) when serving only the rigid
consumers. Its payoff when serving the whole market at utility level U determined by the
11Formally, we solve for a subgame perfect ε-equilibrium because there are subgames for which there does not
exist a strictly best response. However, the only subgames for which that is the case are ones not reached along the
equilibrium path, so the equilibrium payoffs in Proposition 2 are exact. We discuss below the alternative timing in
which the incumbent decides quality before the entrant.
11
entrant’s offer is v jI (U,θI, pI). The critical value of γ below which the incumbent prefers to
serve only the rigid consumers is γ̂ j(U,θI, pI) defined by
γ̂ j(U,θI, pI) =

1, if v jI (U,θI, pI)< 0;
1− v
j
I (U,θI ,pI)
v jI (u
j(θI ,pI),θI ,pI)
, if 0≤ v jI (U,θI, pI)< v jI
(
u j(θI, pI),θI, pI
)
;
0, if v jI (U,θI, pI)≥ v jI (u j(θI, pI),θI, pI).
(12)
That is, if γ < γ̂ j(U,θI, pI), there are too few flexible consumers for it to be worth the incumbent
competing for them by offering the payoff U . The top and bottom cases in (12) are corner
solutions where either the incumbent never finds it worthwhile to compete (top case) or always
retains the flexible consumers (bottom case). As U increases, the critical value of γ̂ j(U,θI, pI)
increases and the incumbent is in a weaker position to compete. Define U¯ j(γ,θI, pI) by
γ = γ̂ j(U¯ j(γ,θI, pI),θI, pI) (13)
as the highest utility the incumbent is willing to offer to retain the flexible consumers. Note that
U¯ j(γ,θI, pI)> u j(θI, pI) because the incumbent is always willing to give up a small amount of
payoff per consumer served to acquire the discrete proportion γ of flexible consumers.
The next proposition gives a necessary and sufficient condition for entry and specifies how
consumers fare with and without entry. Recall that U˜ ji (θi, pi), for i ∈ {I,E}, is the highest
utility provider type j can provide without making a loss.
Proposition 2 Entry by type k occurs with incumbent type j, for j,k ∈ {FP,NP}, if and only if
γ ≤ γ̂ j(U˜kE(θE , pE),θI, pI). (14)
If no entry occurs, payoffs for both rigid and flexible consumers are u j(θI, pI). If entry occurs,
rigid consumer payoffs are u j(θI, pI) and flexible consumer payoffs are as follows:
max
{
U˜ jI (θI, pI),u
k(θE , pE)
}
, if γ ≥ γ̂ j
(
U˜ jI (θI, pI),θI, pI
)
;
max
{
U¯ j(γ,θI, pI),uk(θE , pE)
}
, otherwise.
(15)
Entry strictly increases the utility of flexible consumers while leaving the utility of rigid con-
sumers unchanged.12
12If the ordering of Stages 2 and 3 in the timing of the entry game are reversed so that the incumbent moves
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This result applies for all possible organizational forms and efficiency levels for the incum-
bent and entrant. To understand it, note that U˜kE(θE , pE) determines how hard the potential
entrant can compete for flexible consumers since it is the highest level of utility that it can offer
them and still be worth entering. The key issue is whether the proportion of flexible consumers
γ is greater than γ̂ j(U˜kE(θE , pE),θI, pI). If it is, there is no entry because it is worthwhile for the
incumbent to compete and retain the flexible consumers by offering them more than the highest
utility the potential entrant can afford to offer. In this case, the potential entrant would be unable
to capture any of the market and would not enter. If γ is below γ̂ j(U˜kE(θE , pE),θI, pI) (condition
(14)), the entrant can attract the flexible consumers. But it is worth entering to do that only if
it has a positive payoff. This is the case for U ≤ U˜kE(θE , pE). Hence this condition is also
sufficient for entry. The second part of the proposition shows how consumers of different types
fare with entry. Rigid consumers neither gain nor lose with entry because entry occurs only
if the entrant can successfully attract the flexible consumers and, in that case, the incumbent
has no reason to respond by offering the rigid consumers anything other than what it would
offer in the absence of entry. However, flexible consumers gain whenever there is entry, despite
the unobservable quality dimension, because the entrant has to offer a higher utility to them to
make it unattractive for the incumbent to more than match that offer.13
4.2 For-profit Entry
Proposition 2 shows that, whatever the organizational forms of the incumbent and the entrant,
flexible consumers gain, and rigid consumers do not lose, with entry despite the unobserved
quality dimension. But organizational form has an impact both on when entry occurs and on
the size of the gains when it does occur. We consider first the politically controversial case
in which a for-profit entrant is permitted to compete with a not-for-profit incumbent. We do
this for the case in which the funding level is the same for both incumbent and entrant, which
applies, for example, to payment by diagnosis related group under US Medicare or payment by
results in the British National Health Service. For this section, therefore, pE = pI = p.14
before the entrant, the necessary and sufficient condition for entry (14) is unchanged. The threat of entry (without
actual entry) can then increase the payoffs to both rigid and flexible consumers. But the equilibrium has the
unappealing characteristic that neither type of consumer necessarily gains when entry actually occurs.
13The welfare results do not go through if there is either an internality whereby flexible consumers do not know
their own true welfare or an externality from flexible consumers to rigid consumers as in the case of peer group
effects.
14We consider below whether differentiating the payment between the incumbent and entrant is optimal.
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Proposition 3 When a not-for-profit incumbent competes with a for-profit potential entrant, a
necessary condition for entry is that θE > θI . For flexible consumers, entry increases observed
quality but reduces unobserved quality to the minimal level.
This proposition says that θE > θI is necessary for entry. For θE ≤ θI , the utility pro-
vided by a not-for-profit incumbent in the absence of entry, U∗ (α,θI, p), is greater than the
highest utility a for-profit entrant with the same efficiency parameter can profitably provide,
i.e. U˜FPE (θE , p). That reflects the not-for-profit incumbent’s provision of unobserved quality,
which gives it an implicit cost advantage given the strict convexity of the cost function when
competing with a for-profit entrant that can provide utility only by spending on observable
quality.15 This suggests a reason for why it is difficult to obtain effective for-profit competition
in some contexts, such as US school districts or the British National Health Service, which
have established not-for-profit incumbents.
For a sufficiently high entrant efficiency level, θE , it is infeasible for the incumbent to
compete with the entrant because the incumbent cannot feasibly offer U˜FPE (θE , p) due to the
breakeven constraint. At this point γ̂NP(U˜FPE (θE , p) ,θI, p) = 1 and there is entry for all γ ∈
[0,1]. Thus, a large enough entrant efficiency advantage is sufficient for entry. Because the not-
for-profit incumbent sets unobservable quality above the minimal level, whereas the for-profit
entrant sets it at zero, unobservable quality for flexible consumers falls with entry. However,
as Proposition 2 showed, their utility increases with entry because, to attract them, the entrant
must offer observed quality sufficiently high to compensate for the loss in unobserved quality.
Indeed, observed quality provided by the for-profit entrant must not only be higher than that
offered by the not-for-profit incumbent but discretely higher because the drop in unobserved
quality is discrete.
The basic logic of the model is illustrated in Figure 1. The curve ‘CC’ is the zero-profit
line for the incumbent that gives the combinations of (Q,q) just attainable for given θI and p
without the incumbent incurring a loss. It moves out with higher θI and p. The indifference
curves for consumers are downward sloping straight lines, with higher lines corresponding to
higher utility. The first best qualities for consumers given θI and p are at point A. Figure 1
illustrates the case with α > 1 in which the incumbent prefers a higher ratio of Q to q so, when
a monopolist, offers a point such as B. A for-profit entrant produces only on the q-axis. If its
15This is different from Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006) where the cost advantage of a not-for-profit comes
from its access to donations.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Entry Condition
zero-profit amount of q is below D, it cannot match the utility the monopoly incumbent offers
at B without making a loss and so will not enter. If its zero-profit amount of q is above E, it
can offer higher utility than the incumbent can afford at A and still make a profit, and so will
certainly enter. If its zero-profit amount of q is between D and E, whether it enters depends
on whether it is better for the incumbent to compete for the flexible consumers or to serve
just the rigid ones at B. It is clear from this diagram why a for-profit entrant needs θE strictly
greater than θI — it must be able to reach D without making a loss, whereas the incumbent can
reach only C on the q-axis. Figure 1 also illustrates that this basic logic does not depend on
the particular functional forms we have used for consumer utility and for the cost of providing
quality. It applies as long as, for given efficiency, it is less costly to provide utility with strictly
higher unobserved quality than a for-profit provides.
We now look at how the cost difference and the extent of the incumbent’s preference for
quality affect the likelihood of entry.
Proposition 4 When a not-for-profit incumbent competes with a for-profit potential entrant,
the critical value of γ at which entry occurs is, whenever less than one, increasing as α moves
further away from one and increasing in θE . Moreover, if there is entry when U˜FPE (θE , p) <
U˜NPI (θI, p), the utility of flexible consumers increases as α moves further away from one.
A higher critical value of γ increases the range of γ for which entry takes place. Proposition
4 thus implies that a more efficient entrant (higher θE) and a more paternalistic incumbent (α
further from one) increase the probability of entry. These are intuitive. When θE is higher,
the entrant can afford a more aggressive offer to the flexible consumers in order to attract
15
them. When the incumbent is more paternalistic, it would lean towards serving only the rigid
consumers rather than compromising and serving the flexible consumers when the entrant tries
to attract them.
4.3 Varying Incumbent and Entrant Motives
We next consider what happens when the incumbent and entrant are both for-profit or both
not-for-profit. Not only do these widen the comparisons, they also allow us to appreciate better
why having not-for-profit provision makes a difference when there is competition. We again
do this for equal funding to incumbent and entrant so, for this section also, pE = pI = p.
Here we have the following result:
Proposition 5 1. Incumbent and potential entrant both for-profit.
γˆFP
(
U˜FPE (θE , p) ,θI, p
)
= min
{
θE
θI
,1
}
. (16)
A sufficient condition for entry is that θE ≥ θI . For flexible consumers, entry increases
observed quality but leaves unobserved quality at the minimal level.
2. Incumbent and potential entrant both not-for-profit. A sufficient condition for entry is
that θE > θI .
To understand the implications of Proposition 5, consider first the case in which both in-
cumbent and potential entrant are for-profit providers (Case 1). An efficiency advantage for the
entrant (θE ≥ θI) is then sufficient for entry. But it is not necessary. Even if θE < θI , entry is
still possible if γ ≤ θE/θI , since the incumbent may prefer to make a higher profit per consumer
on just the rigid consumers than a lower profit per consumer on all consumers.16
The case in which both incumbent and potential entrant are not-for-profit providers (Case
2 in Proposition 5) has similarities with the case of competing for-profit providers (Case 1).17
Specifically, entry occurs for sure if θE > θI . This is because a not-for-profit entrant’s choice
16With θE < θI , then U˜FPE (θE , p) < U˜FPI (θI , p), so offering the consumer utility in the top line in (15) in
Proposition 2 would impose a loss on the entrant. Hence, if entry occurs, it must be that the bottom line in (15)
in Proposition 2 applies. Moreover, with a for-profit entrant, uFP (θE , p) = 0. Thus the utility of the flexible
consumers is U¯FP (γ,θI , p) defined in (13). This can be evaluated by equating 1− γ times the incumbent payoff
in (2) for U = 0 to the incumbent payoff in (2) for U = U¯FP (γ,θI , p) to give U¯FP (γ,θI , p) = c−1 (γ pθI).
17It is straightforward to derive expressions for γ̂NP(U˜kE (θE , p) ,θI , p) for k ∈ {FP,NP} for the case in which
the incumbent is a not-for-profit provider but this offers little additional insight and so is not included in the
proposition.
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of observable quality effectively commits it to providing the quality bundle that maximizes
consumer utility subject to its breakeven constraint if that is required to attract flexible con-
sumers. Thus, in contrast to entry by a for-profit provider, the incumbent no longer has an
implicit cost advantage from its provision of unobserved quality. As a result, for θE > θI , we
have γ̂NP(U˜NPE (θE , p) ,θI, p) = 1 and entry occurs for all γ . In effect the incumbent cannot then
offer the utility that a more efficient entrant offers to flexible consumers.
In Case 2 in Proposition 5, entry is also possible with θE ≤ θI if γ is low enough. This
can be seen from Figure 1 where a not-for-profit entrant, even with θE slightly lower than θI ,
can offer a quality combination above the indifference curve through point B, which is why it
does not have to have higher θE > θI to enter. Comparing this with Proposition 3 shows that
there is a range of θE for which there is no entry with a for-profit entrant while there is entry
with a not-for-profit entrant. Thus entry can occur with a lower entrant efficiency advantage
if the entrant is not-for-profit than if it is for-profit. Another way to think about this is that
the range of γ for which there is entry when the entrant, as well as the incumbent, is not-for-
profit is strictly wider than when the entrant is for-profit. This stems from the not-for-profit
entrant’s similar implicit cost advantage to the incumbent because its preferences ensure that it
delivers positive unobservable quality. Thus, a not-for-profit potential entrant may enter when
a for-profit potential entrant with the same efficiency would not, which is consistent with much
competition in education and health services in practice being by not-for-profit providers.
When, with competition between two not-for-profit providers (Case 2 in Proposition 5),
entry occurs with θE ≤ θI , it is purely because of preference divergence between the incumbent
provider and consumers, not because of any cost advantage. To illustrate this formally, consider
the case of θE = θI , in which case neither incumbent nor entrant has an inherent cost advantage.
We know from Proposition 3 that a for-profit provider never enters in this case, so entry is
possible only if there is a not-for-profit entrant. If α were equal to 1, the incumbent would, even
without entry, always make the choices optimal for consumers given the breakeven constraint,
so we would have uNP (θI, p) = U˜NPI (θI, p) . Since θE = θI the entrant could not offer utility
greater than this to attract flexible consumers, so entry would not occur. Thus, entry can occur
only if α 6= 1. Then, even without a cost advantage, a not-for-profit entrant can provide higher
utility to flexible consumers by offering a quality mix that is closer to what consumers prefer.
Provided the proportion of flexible consumers is small enough, the incumbent will prefer to
serve only the rigid consumers with the monopoly quality mix than to compete to retain the
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flexible consumers. Moreover, U˜NPE (θE , p) = U˜
NP
I (θI, p) when θE = θI . So, when flexible
consumers receive payoff U˜NPI (θI, p), as in the upper line of (15), the preference divergence
between the entrant and consumers is completely undone, with flexible consumers getting their
maximal utility given the productive efficiency of the provider.
The next result compares the payoffs to consumers with competition when the incumbent
is a not-for-profit provider, rather than a for-profit provider. Proposition 1 showed that, in
the absence of competition, consumers are always better off with a not-for-profit provider no
matter how much more efficient a for-profit provider is. The following result applies when
there is competition.
Proposition 6 With competition between providers, rigid consumers receive higher utility with
a not-for-profit than with a for-profit incumbent. When entry occurs, flexible consumers receive
higher utility with a not-for-profit incumbent than with a for-profit incumbent of the same effi-
ciency; specifically, U˜NPI (θI, p)≥ U¯NP(γ,θI, p)> U˜FPI (θI, p)≥ U¯FP (γ,θI, p) for all (γ,θI, p).
This result establishes that, provided entry occurs, all consumers have higher utility with a
not-for-profit incumbent than with a for-profit incumbent of the same efficiency. Of particular
interest is the result that a not-for-profit incumbent is always willing to offer higher utility to
attract flexible consumers than the highest utility a for-profit incumbent of the same efficiency
can afford (that is, U¯NP(γ,θI, p) > U˜FPI (θI, p)). This is because the cost function is strictly
convex, so a not-for-profit (which values unobservable quality) can provide given consumer
utility at lower cost than a for-profit with the same efficiency parameter.
The payoff gains in Proposition 6 from having a not-for-profit, rather than a for-profit,
incumbent are conditional on entry occurring. However, it follows from Propositions 3 and 5
that a higher efficiency entrant is required for entry to occur with a not-for-profit incumbent
than with a for-profit incumbent of the same efficiency. Thus entry may not occur with a
not-for-profit incumbent even though it would have occurred with a for-profit incumbent of
the same efficiency. In that case, flexible consumers may have lower expected utility with a
not-for-profit incumbent than with a for-profit one when the probability of entry is taken into
account. Rigid consumers, though, always do better with a not-for-profit incumbent, so the two
types of consumers may have conflicting interests.
Proposition 6 compares consumer payoffs with for-profit and not-for-profit incumbents.
Flexible consumers may also receive higher utility from having a not-for-profit entrant than
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from having a for-profit entrant with the same efficiency. This can happen in two ways. One
way is that a sufficiently productive not-for-profit entrant may choose to provide utility higher
than the minimum required to attract flexible consumers, as a result of which the second term
in the maximum expressions in (15) exceeds the first. In contrast, a for-profit entrant never
offers utility higher than the minimum required to attract flexible consumers because to do
so would lower profit. The other way is because, given the strictly convex cost function and
that the not-for-profit entrant provides both types of quality, the highest utility a not-for-profit
entrant can afford is always strictly greater than the highest utility a for-profit entrant with the
same efficiency can afford, that is, U˜NPE (θE , p)> U˜
FP
E (θE , p). In this case, there is no conflict
between rigid and flexible consumers.
5 Pricing Policy
We have so far assumed that an entrant receives the same capitation fee as the incumbent. We
now explore optimal payment for the public service, including whether it is optimal to pay
a per capita amount to an entrant different from that to the incumbent in order to encourage
or discourage entry. With standard voucher schemes for education, such as that introduced in
Sweden in 1992, a consumer can transfer the public funding to the entrant.18 However, the
value of a voucher could be different from the public funding for the incumbent. Here we
consider payment that is optimal from the perspective of consumers who pay taxes to fund the
service with a constant marginal cost of public funds ξ ≥ 1 and show that, in general, it is
optimal to treat entrants and incumbents differently.19 This in turn affects the probability of
entry.
We look at a regulator’s optimal choice of pI and pE from an ex ante perspective, i.e. before
the efficiency of the potential entrant is known, for the case of a not-for-profit incumbent facing
18The kind of voucher that we have in mind here is like that used in Sweden where no consumer-financed
“top-up” is allowed.
19We could, as in standard models of regulation, introduce a welfare weight that values providers’ payoffs,
though possibly somewhat less than consumer utility. Our framework is, however, somewhat non-standard be-
cause, in the case of not-for-profit provision, provider payoffs take the form of “decision rents” rather than mon-
etary profits. Moreover, the question of how the welfare of teachers and doctors should count in the provision of
the services is moot. In political economy models, it is common to ignore the welfare of providers (politicians
and bureaucrats) and simply count the welfare of voters. In the case of for-profit providers, the policy debate
often proceeds as if there should be a negative weight on profit in public service provision. For example, in the
UK, there is a campaign called “Public Services Not Private Profit” supported by around 14 major trade unions
whose objective could be interpreted in this way, as could the objective of a lobby group such as “We Own it”
https://weownit.org.uk/ whose strap line is “Public Services for People not Profit".
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a for-profit potential entrant. For given (pI, pE), there will, by Proposition 2, be entry if θE
is large enough. Specifically, let θˆE (pE , pI) denote the entrant efficiency level that makes the
incumbent just unwilling to offer the highest consumer utility the entrant is prepared to offer
to retain the flexible consumers. (θˆE (pE , pI) also depends on θI but that is taken as given for
this analysis.) This efficiency level is defined by equality in (14) for k = FP with U˜FPE (θE , pE)
defined by (3), that is by
γ = γ̂ j(c−1(pE θˆE (pE , pI)),θI, pI). (17)
The probability of entry is then 1−G(θˆE (pE , pI)). Also let Uˆ(θI,γ, pI) be the utility of a
flexible consumer who switches to the entrant as given by Proposition 2. It does not depend on
either θE or pE because uk (θE , pE) = 0 for all (θE , pE) for k = FP, so the consumer utilities
in (15) do not in this case depend on (θE , pE). Ex ante expected consumer welfare for given
(pI, pE) is then
[
(1− γ)+ γG(θˆE (pE , pI))] [U∗ (α,θI, pI)−ξ pI]
+ γ
[
1−G(θˆE (pE , pI))][Uˆ (θI,γ, pI)−ξ pE] . (18)
The regulator chooses (pI, pE) to maximize this. The first term in (18) is the welfare of rigid
consumers plus that of flexible consumers for the entrant efficiency levels for which there
is no entry, i.e. θE < θˆE (pE , pI), the second term the welfare of flexible consumers when
θE ≥ θˆE (pE , pI) and hence entry occurs. Changing the payments to providers has three main
effects on consumer welfare in (18). Increasing funding to either the incumbent or the entrant
necessitates higher taxes which reduce consumers’ welfare. Counteracting this is an increase
in quality. For rigid or flexible consumers who remain with the not-for-profit incumbent, this
effect is direct. However, increasing pI also affects the utility of flexible consumers who switch
since their utility level is set by what the incumbent would be prepared to offer to retain them.
Finally, funding arrangements change the probability of entry, i.e. the critical efficiency level at
which an entrant finds it worthwhile to enter.
An important policy question is whether the per capita payment to the entrant should be
the same as that to the incumbent, that is pE = pI , the so-called “level playing field”. To state
the results on this, let ∆U (pI) = Uˆ (θI,γ, pI)−U∗ (α,θI, pI) be the utility gain to a flexible
consumer of switching to the entrant.20
20Arguments other than pI are suppressed for notational simplicity because they are given for the analysis of
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Proposition 7 Suppose that a not-for-profit incumbent faces a for-profit entrant and a policy-
maker sets the per capita payment to the entrant, pE , to maximize expected consumer welfare
(18) for given per capita payment to the incumbent, pI . Then for g(θE) log-concave and
optimal θˆE (pE , pI) ∈
[
θ , θ¯
]
, the optimal per capita payment to the entrant is the unique p∗E
that satisfies [
∆U (pI)
ξ
+(pI− p∗E)
]
θˆE (pE , pI)
p∗E
=
1−G(θˆE (p∗E , pI))
g
(
θˆE (p∗E , pI)
) . (19)
Equation (19) applies for any pI , including the optimal value that maximizes expected con-
sumer welfare (18) when the density function is log-concave.21 In general, it implies p∗E 6= pI .
To understand the implications of Proposition 7, define
η
(
θˆE (pE , pI)
)
=
g
(
θˆE (pE , pI)
)
θˆE (pE , pI)
1−G(θˆE (pE , pI)) . (20)
This corresponds to the elasticity of the entry probability with respect to the payment to the
entrant given the definition of θˆE (pE , pI) in (17). It depends on the shape of the distribution
of the potential entrant’s efficiency parameter, θE . Rearranging (19), we have the following
formula for the optimal payment to the entrant
p∗E =
η
(
θˆE (p∗E , pI)
)
[∆U (pI)+ξ pI][
1+η
(
θˆE (p∗E , pI)
)]
ξ
, (21)
which also holds for any value of pI . The value of the payment p∗E is thus increasing in η(·),
i.e. the more responsive is entry to a higher payment then the larger it is all else equal. The
payment should also be more generous when the marginal gain to the flexible consumers from
switching to the entrant, ∆U (pI), is larger. This makes sense as entry is better for flexible
consumers in this case.
An attractive feature of (21) is that it depends on magnitudes that can be specified in ap-
plications. For example suppose that the entrant efficiency parameter θE follows a Pareto dis-
tribution with shape parameter ζ , i.e. G(θE) = 1− (θ/θE)ζ , then η
(
θˆE (pE , pI)
)
= ζ .22 This
is motivated by noting from Axtell (2001) that the size distribution of firms suggests that pro-
this section.
21Log-concavity of the density is satisfied by many standard probability distributions and is widely used in
economic models, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005). Its role in Proposition 7 is to ensure that (19) has only one
solution for p∗E . Without it, the optimal entrant payment for θˆE (pE , pI) ∈
(
θ , θ¯
)
will still satisfy (19) but there
may be multiple solutions to (19), so one would have to check which corresponds to a maximum of (18).
22The results in Proposition 7 actually hold for G(θ) a Pareto distribution even though the density function for
that distribution is not log-concave.
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ductivity follows a Zipf distribution, i.e. a Pareto distribution with ζ = 1. A value of ξ = 1.5
is a reasonable figure in line with many estimates of the cost of public funds and pI would be
known from the funding levels currently used in the market. The only additional element of
(21) needed to apply the formula for policy purposes would be ∆U (pI), i.e. the “willingness to
pay” by flexible consumers to switch to the entrant.
To illustrate how to apply this formula, consider the case of hip replacement surgery in the
UK. A National Health Service (NHS) provider is paid around £5000 per operation while the
cost of private treatment is around £10,000. If the latter is all out of pocket, we could use it as
a rough estimate ∆U (pI) because it measures consumers’ willingness to pay for the additional
benefit of the private treatment. (In this context, an important element of the higher observable
quality offered by a private provider is a reduction in waiting time.) Then if η = 1 and ξ = 1.5,
the optimal amount that the NHS should pay for a hip replacement from a private provider
should an NHS patient wish to switch, is
p∗E =
£10,000+£7,500
3
' £5,833.
So this is a case where the per capita payment to the entrant should be larger than the current per
capita payment to the incumbent but less than the standard private treatment fee. These specific
numbers are, of course, only illustrative but they show how Proposition 7 can be applied to
real-world cases.23
6 Concluding Comments
This paper argues that, while a case can be made for allowing competition by for-profit providers
in public service provision despite difficulties in assessing quality, there is a benefit to retaining
a not-for-profit incumbent. This is an important principle for policy design which does not
seem to be widely recognized. The logic of this follows either from the insight of Glaeser and
Shleifer (2001) that when, following the logic in Hansmann (1980), there is an unobservable
quality dimension to output, not-for-profit providers offer higher unobservable quality than for-
profit providers or from the recognition by Newhouse (1970) that many not-for-profit providers
have a bias towards quality that is not solely paternalistic but also reflects producer interests.
23The argument presented here can be extended to cover the case where the entrant is not-for-profit. This affects
the critical θˆ (pE , pI) but the core factors which shape optimal funding for entrants remain the same.
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The view that provider interests matter fits a range of services where physicians, lawyers
and teachers run public services according to their views of what is good for consumers, and
implies that providers earn decision rents even if with not-for-profit status. Monopoly pro-
vision with public funding does not then guarantee that consumers get what they want from
public services even if incumbents provide some unobserved quality that would not be pro-
vided by profit-maximizing firms. This motivates why competition is valuable over and above
considerations of cost efficiency.
Our model captures an important trade-off: while retaining a not-for-profit incumbent ben-
efits consumers conditional on entry occurring, it reduces the probability of beneficial entry.
If entry does not occur, it is better for consumers to have a not-for-profit provider. Moreover,
a not-for-profit provider can enter with a lower cost advantage over the incumbent than a for-
profit provider. These are consistent with many schools and hospitals in areas where there is no
competition being set up as not-for-profit institutions and, where there is competition, much of
it being among not-for-profit providers.
As well as exploring entry conditions, the paper has shown that offering entrants a “level
playing field” (that is, the same capitation fee, or voucher of the same value, as the incumbent)
is not generally optimal. Depending on ex ante market conditions, it may be optimal to pay
the entrant either less or more than the incumbent. The model offers an insight into the factors
determining payment that can be applied in specific situations.
There are potential downsides to competition where there are externalities or internalities
that arise through consumers not knowing their own true welfare. We have not included these
in our model because they are well known. But Appendix B shows that our main results are
robust to allowing for a more general objective function for not-for-profit firms, a continuous
distribution of switching costs/benefits for consumers and multiple quality dimensions. Our
model could also be developed in a range of ways other ways. In future work, it would be
interesting to enrich the analysis by looking at the endogenous choice of not-for-profit status.
One could also allow for differential selection of providers’ employees by competence and
motivation, as in Barigozzi and Burani (2016), and how competition affects this. There is, in
addition, scope to explore a range of wider contractual possibilities and regulatory approaches.
But our basic insights rely essentially only on not-for-profit providers offering a level of some
unobserved dimension of quality different from for-profit providers that makes it less costly,
for given production efficiency, to provide given consumer utility. As long as this characteristic
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is retained, we would expect our fundamental insights to hold.
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 That uFP (θI, pI) = 0 for all (θI, pI) follows directly from maximiza-
tion of vFPI (U,θI, pI) specified in (2) subject to U ≥ 0. That uNP (θI, pI) =U∗ (α,θI, pI) > 0
for all (θI, pI) follows from the definition of U∗ (α,θI, pI) in (7) and that this is strictly positive
because both Q∗ (α,θi, pi) and q∗ (α,θi, pi) are strictly positive. With a monopoly not-for-profit
incumbent, consumers’ utility is given by (7) with i = I. For any parameter z ∈ {α,θI, pI},
∂U∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂ z
=
∂Q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂ z
+
∂q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂ z
. (A.1)
From the first-order conditions (6), note that µ must be strictly greater than zero, so the profit
constraint (5) holds with equality. From these, for i = I and xI > 0,
αc′ (q∗ (α,θI, pI)) = c′ (Q∗ (α,θI, pI)) (A.2)
and
θI pI = c(Q∗ (α,θI, pI))+ c(q∗ (α,θI, pI)). (A.3)
Consider first z = α . Differentiation of (A.3) with respect to α gives
c′ (Q∗ (α,θI, pI))
∂Q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂α
+ c′ (q∗ (α,θI, pI))
∂q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂α
= 0
and, hence,
∂q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂α
=−c
′ (Q∗ (α,θI, pI))
c′ (q∗ (α,θI, pI))
∂Q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂α
. (A.4)
Substitution for c′(Q∗ (α,θI, pI)) in (A.4) from (A.2) gives
∂q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂α
=−α ∂Q
∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂α
which, substituted into (A.1) for z = α , gives
∂U∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂α
= (1−α) ∂Q
∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂α
.
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Differentiation of (A.2) with respect to α gives
αc′′ (q∗ (α,θI, pI))
∂q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂α
+ c′ (q∗ (α,θI, pI))
− c′′ (Q∗ (α,θI, pI)) ∂Q
∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂α
= 0.
Substitution for ∂q∗ (α,θI, pI)/∂α in this from (A.4) gives
∂Q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂α
[
c(Q∗ (α,θI, pI))
c′ (q∗ (α,θI, pI))
αc′′ (q∗ (α,θI, pI))+ c′′ (Q∗ (α,θI, pI))
]
= c′ (q∗ (α,θI, pI)) ,
which implies ∂Q∗ (α,θI, pI)/∂α > 0 and hence ∂U∗ (α,θI, pI)/∂α ≷ 1 according as α ≶ 1
because c is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
Next consider z = θI . Differentiation of (A.2) and (A.3) with respect to θI gives
αc′′ (q∗ (α,θI, pI))
∂q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂θI
− c′′ (Q∗ (α,θI, pI)) ∂Q
∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂θI
= 0
and
c′ (Q∗ (α,θI, pI))
∂Q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂θI
+ c′ (q∗ (α,θI, pI))
∂q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂θI
= pI. (A.5)
The former can be solved for ∂Q∗ (α,θI, pI)/∂θI to give
∂Q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂θI
=
αc′′ (q∗ (α,θI, pI))
c′′ (Q∗ (α,θI, pI))
∂q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂θI
. (A.6)
Use of this in (A.1) for z = θI gives
∂U∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂θI
=
[
αc′ (q∗ (α,θI, pI))
c′′ (Q∗ (α,θI, pI))
+1
]
∂q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂θI
,
which is positive if ∂q∗ (α,θI, pI)/∂θI > 0. Use of (A.6) in (A.5) and substitution for c′ (Q∗ (α,θI, pI))
from (A.2) gives
[
α2c′ (q∗ (α,θI, pI))
c′′ (Q∗ (α,θI, pI))
+1
]
c′(q∗ (α,θI, pI))
∂q∗ (α,θI, pI)
∂θI
= pI ,
from which ∂q∗ (α,θI, pI)/∂θI > 0 because c is strictly increasing and strictly convex. For
z = pI , the argument is essentially identical to that for z = θI .
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Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose entry were to occur when (14) does not hold. Then, by the
definition of γ̂ j(U,θI, pI) in (12), the incumbent would compete to supply the whole market
for even the highest payoff U˜kE(θE , pE) the entrant would be willing to offer the γ flexible
consumers. So the entrant would not succeed in acquiring the flexible consumers and thus no
entry would occur, which is a contradiction.24
Suppose now (14) holds. Then, by the definition of γ̂ j(U,θI, pI) in (12), the incumbent
would not compete for the γ flexible consumers if the entrant were to offer U˜kE(θE , pE). By
offering U˜kE(θE , pE), the entrant would make no less payoff than from not entering and would
acquire the flexible consumers, so entry occurs.
For determining consumer payoffs, there are two cases to consider.
Case 1: γ ≥ γ̂ j(U˜ jI (θI, pI),θI, pI). In this case, there are sufficient flexible consumers for
it to be worth the incumbent competing for them at the highest utility it is ever prepared to
offer, U˜ jI (θI, pI). If entry occurs (which in this case is only if U˜
k
E(θE , pE)≥ U˜ jI (θI, pI) because
otherwise (14) is not satisfied), the entrant offers utility of U˜ jI (θI, pI) so that it is not worth
the incumbent attracting flexible consumers or, if higher, the payoff uk(θE , pE) it would offer
in the absence of competition. The incumbent offers utility u j(θI, pI) and attracts only the
rigid consumers, who thus receive utility u j(θI, pI). Flexible consumers choose the entrant and
receive payoff max{U˜ jI (θI, pI),uk(θE , pE)}.
Case 2: γ < γ̂ j(U˜ jI (θI, pI),θI, pI). In this case, there are insufficient flexible consumers for
it to be worth the incumbent competing for them at the highest utility it is ever prepared to
offer, U˜ jI (θI, pI). If entry occurs, therefore, the entrant offers the lowest consumer payoff,
U¯ j(γ,θI, pI) defined in (13), for which it is not worth the incumbent competing for flexible
consumers or, if higher, the payoff uk(θE , pE) it would offer in the absence of competition. The
incumbent then offers u j(θI, pI) and serves only the rigid consumers, who thus receive utility
u j(θI, pI). Flexible consumers choose the entrant and receive payoff max{U¯ j(γ,θI, pI),uk(θE , pE)}.
Entry increases the utility of flexible consumers because U˜ jI (θI, pI)≥ U¯ j(γ,θI, pI)> u j(θI, pI)
and leaves utility of rigid consumers unchanged because they receive u j(θI, pI) both with and
without entry.
24While there exists no best response for the incumbent to an offer by the entrant of payoff U˜kE(θE , pE) in this
subgame because indifferent flexible consumers choose the entrant, some offer by the incumbent strictly greater
than U˜kE(θE , pE) is always better than an offer less than or equal to U˜kE(θE , pE) and ensures that the potential entrant
does not actually enter. For this reason, the equilibrium described in Proposition 2 is technically a subgame perfect
ε-equilibrium. Because, however, this subgame is not reached along the equilibrium path, the equilibrium payoffs
in Proposition 2 are exact, not approximate.
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Proof of Proposition 3 For a not-for-profit incumbent with pI = p, uNP (θI, p)=U∗ (α,θI, p).
We first show that, if θE ≤ θI , then U∗ (α,θI, p)> U˜FPE (θE , p). Suppose not. Then from (3),
pθE = c
(
U˜FPE (θE , p)
)
> c
(
U˜FPE (θE , p)−q∗ (α,θI, p)
)
+ c(q∗ (α,θI, p))
> c(U∗ (α,θI, p)−q∗ (α,θI, p))+ c(q∗ (α,θI, p))
= pθI .
The second line of this follows because c is strictly convex, the third line from the supposition
that U∗ (α,θI, p)≤ U˜FPE (θE , p), and the final line because the breakeven constraint for the not-
for-profit incumbent (5) holds with equality. This contradicts θE ≤ θI so it must be the case that,
when that condition holds, U∗ (α,θI, p) > U˜FPE (θE , p). But then the payoff to consumers that
the not-for-profit incumbent would choose to offer even if not competing for flexible consumers
is greater than the highest payoff the for-profit potential entrant would offer them. So the entrant
would never attract the flexible consumers and so would not enter. Since in this case QI > 0
and QE = 0, entry reduces unobservable quality for flexible consumers to the minimal level.
But, from Proposition 2, their payoff increases with entry so it must be that qE > qI . Thus entry
increases observable quality for flexible consumers.
Proof of Proposition 4 Let
ϕ (U,α,θI, p) =
αQˆ∗ (U,θI, p)+ qˆ∗ (U,θI, p)
αQ∗ (α,θI, p)+q∗ (α,θI, p)
.
Observe that the denominator in this is a maximum value function for the monopoly not-for-
profit’s maximization problem with Q∗(α,θI, p) and q∗(α,θI, p) the maximizers and that α
enters only the objective function and not the constraint. So, by the envelope theorem, its
derivative with respect to α is just Q∗(α,θI, p). Moreover, Qˆ∗(U,θI, p) and qˆ∗(U,θI, p) are
independent of α . Thus
sgn
∂ϕ(U,α,θI, p)
∂α
= sgn[Qˆ∗ (U,θI, p)q∗ (α,θI, p)
−Q∗ (α,θI, p) qˆ∗ (U,θI, p)]. (A.7)
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If α > 1, then (A.7) is negative since Qˆ∗(U,θI, p)<Q∗(α,θI, p) and qˆ∗(U,θI, p)> q∗(α,θI, p).
If α < 1, then (A.7) is positive since Qˆ∗(U,θI, p)>Q∗(α,θI, p) and qˆ∗(U,θI, p)< q∗(α,θI, p).
Hence ϕ (U,α,θI, p) decreases as α moves further from one.
Note from (12) that, for entry to occur with γ̂ j(U,θI, p)= 0, it must be that the utility U
offered by the entrant satisfies U = u j (θI, p) because indifferent flexible consumers choose the
entrant and offering higher U would reduce the entrant’s profit. It then follows from (11) and
(12) that, when less than one,
γ̂NP(U,θI, p) = 1−ϕ (U,α,θI, p) ,
which is thus increasing in α for α > 1 and decreasing in α for α < 1 for any U and, in
particular, for U = U˜FPE (θE , p).
Next note that ϕ(.) is decreasing in U when U ≥U∗(α,θI, p) because the numerator is then
the maximum value function of a problem in which an increase in U corresponds to a tighter
constraint. To show γ̂NP(U˜FPE (θE , p),θI, p) is then increasing in θE , it thus suffices to note that
U˜FPE (θE , p) is increasing in θE . From the definition of γ̂ j(U,θI, p) in (12) and U¯ j (γ,θI, p) in
(13),
γ =
vNPI (U
∗ (α,θI, p) ,θI, p)− vNPI (U¯NP(γ,θI, p),θI, p)
vNPI (U∗ (α,θI, p) ,θI, p)
.
The right-hand side of this is just 1−ϕ (U,α,θI, p) evaluated at U = U¯ j (γ,θI, p). It has already
been shown that 1−ϕ (U,α,θI, p) is increasing in α for α > 1 and decreasing in α for α < 1 for
any U and it was previously shown that vNPI (U,θI, p) is decreasing in U , which suffices to
complete the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5 Case 1: For a for-profit incumbent with pI = p, uFP (θI, p) = 0. Use
of this and the incumbent payoff, (2) for i = I, in (12) gives
γˆFP (U,θI, p) = min
{
c(U)− c(0)
pθI− c(0) ,1
}
, (A.8)
which yields γˆFP (U,θI, p) = 1 only if U ≥ U˜FPI (θI, p). When the potential entrant is also a
for-profit provider, from (3) for i = E, U˜FPE (γ,θE) satisfies
c(U˜FPE (θE , p)) = pθE . (A.9)
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Use of this and c(0)= 0 in (A.8) gives (16). By Proposition 2, entry occurs if γ ≤ γ̂ j(U˜kE(θE , p),θI, p).
From (16), when θE ≥ θI , we have γ̂ j(U˜kE(θE , p),θI, p) = 1, so entry occurs for any γ ≤ 1. For-
profit providers always set QI = QE = 0, so unobserved quality for flexible consumers is the
same minimal level with entry as without. But, from Proposition 2, their utility increases with
entry so it must be that qE > qI . Thus entry increases observable quality for flexible consumers.
Case 2: For θE > θI , U˜NPE (θE , p)> U˜
NP
I (θI, p). The entrant is, therefore, always willing to
offer utility higher than the incumbent can afford to attract flexible consumers, so entry always
occurs.
Proof of Proposition 6 From Proposition 2, rigid consumers receive utility u j (θI, p) when
the incumbent is type j ∈ {FP,NP}, which is exactly the same as when type j is a monopoly
provider, so the result for them follows from Proposition 1. Also from Proposition 2, the result
certainly holds for flexible consumers if the utility ranking claimed in the proposition holds.
To establish that ranking, note that U˜ jI (θI, p)≥ U¯ j(γ,θI, p) for j ∈ {FP,NP} follows from the
definition of U˜ jI (θI, p) as the highest utility a type j incumbent with efficiency parameter θI can
feasibly deliver. So, to establish the proposition, it remains to show only that U¯NP(γ,θI, p) >
U˜FPI (θI, p). Suppose contrary to this that U¯NP(γ,θI, p)≤ U˜FPI (θI, p). Then, from (3),
pθI = c
(
U˜FPI (θI, p)
)
> c
(
U˜FPI (θI, p)− qˆ∗(U¯NP (γ,θI, p) ,θI, p)
)
+ c
(
qˆ∗(U¯NP (γ,θI, p) ,θI, p)
)
≥ c(U¯NP(γ,θI, p)− qˆ∗(U¯NP (γ,θI, p) ,θI, p))+ c(qˆ∗(U¯NP (γ,θI, p) ,θI, p))
= c
(
Qˆ∗
(
U¯NP (γ,θI, p)
)
,θI, p
)
+ c
(
qˆ∗
(
U¯NP (γ,θI, p) ,θI, p
))
= pθI .
The second line of this follows because c is strictly convex, the third line from the supposi-
tion that U¯NP(γ,θI, p) ≤ U˜FPI (θI, p), the fourth line from (8) and the final line because the
breakeven constraint for a not-for-profit incumbent (5) holds with equality. But this gives a
contradiction, so it must be that U¯NP(γ,θI, p)> U˜FPI (θI, p).
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Proof of Proposition 7 First note that the welfare criterion (18) is differentiable with respect
to pE for θˆE (pE , pI) ∈
[
θ , θ¯
]
with derivative
−γg(θˆE (pE , pI)) [∆U (pI)+ξ (pI− pE)] ∂ θˆE (pE , pI)∂ pE − γ [1−G(θˆE (pE , pI))]ξ . (A.10)
From (17),
∂ θˆE (pE , pI)
∂ pE
=− θˆE (pE , pI)
pE
(A.11)
so (A.10) can be written
γg
(
θˆE (pE , pI)
)
[∆U (pI)+ξ (pI− pE)] θˆE (pE , pI)pE − γ
[
1−G(θˆE (pE , pI))]ξ . (A.12)
This has the same sign as
g
(
θˆE (pE , pI)
)
1−G(θˆE (pE , pI)) θˆE (pE , pI)
[
∆U (pI)
pE
+ξ
(
pI
pE
−1
)]
−ξ . (A.13)
By Corollary 2 in Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005), g(θE) log-concave implies g(θE)/ [1−G(θE)]
monotone increasing in θE and, from (A.11), θˆE (pE , pI) is decreasing in pE . From this it fol-
lows that the whole expression in (A.13) is decreasing in pE . Thus the derivative (A.12) can be
zero for at most one value of pE — call it p∗E . Moreover, at p∗E it is passing from positive to
negative, so p∗E corresponds to a maximum. Furthermore, for pE low enough, θˆE(pE , pI) = θ¯
and the derivative in (A.12) is positive and for pE high enough the derivative in (A.12) is neg-
ative. Thus there always exists such a p∗E . Setting (A.12) equal to zero and re-arranging gives
(19).
Appendix B A More General Formulation
B.1 Generalized Model and Results
This appendix provides a more general formulation of the core ideas where, instead of having
only two groups of consumers, we allow for the possibility that any consumer is willing to
switch to the entrant. We also allow for more than two dimensions of quality. The main aim of
the section is to show that the core insights from the model in the main text carry over to this
more general setting.
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Suppose consumers differ in their benefit b ∈ [b, b¯] from switching to the entrant, with
distribution function F (b) that admits a density and is log-concave.25 We make no assumption
about the signs of b and b¯, so consumers may prefer to stay with the incumbent, or to switch to
the entrant, when offered the same quality levels by both.
The continuous benefit from switching generalizes the idea of rigid and flexible consumers.
This benefit can arise for a variety of reasons that are relevant for schools and hospitals, reflect-
ing, for example, the geographical location of the incumbent or entrant which makes use of one
of the providers more convenient for some consumers. It might also proxy for other intrinsic
attributes.
Our general formulation also allows for vectors of both types of quality. Specifically, let q1
be an M-element vector of observable qualities, with generic element q1m, that a provider can
commit to before consumers choose their provider, q2 be an N-element vector of unobservable
qualities, with generic element q2n, to which commitment is infeasible before consumers choose
their provider, and q be the overall vector of qualities
(
q1,q2
)
. For notational convenience let
pi denote the vector of parameters in the model.26 All consumers have the same utility U (q,pi)
from provision by the incumbent, which is everywhere strictly increasing in each element of q.
A consumer with switching benefit b has utility U (q,pi)+ b from being served by an entrant
that provides quality vector q. As before, consumers choose provision if and only if they attain
utility of at least zero and those indifferent between providers choose the entrant.
Providers have constant returns to scale and serve all consumers who come to them. They
enter the market if and only if they achieve a positive payoff from doing so and the order of
moves is the same as in the main text.27
As before, for j ∈ {FP,NP} and i ∈ {I,E}, let u j (pi) be the utility to consumers delivered
by a type j provider if not constrained by competition and U˜ ji (pi) > u
j (pi) be the highest
consumer payoff type j is willing to provide, but now both net of switching benefit. Also,
let v ji (U,pi) be the highest payoff available to provider type j if delivering consumer utility U
conditional on having entered the market. This is assumed to be continuously differentiable
and strictly concave in U for all U in excess of what the provider would offer in the absence of
25This is weaker than the more widely used assumption that the density F ′ is log-concave; see Jewitt (1987) for
discussion.
26For the model in the main text, pi = (θI ,θE , pI , pE ,α). However, the parameterization in the generalized
model can be richer than that.
27It is straightforward to introduce an entry cost.
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competition.28
Conditional on utility offers UI and UE from the incumbent and entrant respectively, both
net of switching benefit, consumers with switching benefit b choose I if UI >UE +b. Let
b∗ (UI,UE) =

b , if UI <UE +b
UI−UE , if UE +b≤UI ≤UE + b¯;
b¯ , if UI >UE + b¯;
(B.1)
be the value of b that determines consumer choices given UI and UE and let U
j
I (UE ,pi) denote
the best response utility offer for a type j ∈ {FP,NP} incumbent if the entrant offers UE . We
assume b sufficiently low that the incumbent always chooses to retain some consumers. For
this generalized formulation, the following result corresponds to Proposition 2.
Proposition 8 For j,k ∈ {FP,NP}, a sufficient condition for entry by a type k potential entrant
facing a type j incumbent is that U˜ jI (pi) < U˜
k
E (pi)+ b¯. For U˜
j
I (pi) ≥ U˜kE (pi)+ b¯, a necessary
and sufficient condition for entry by a type k potential entrant facing a type j incumbent is
∂
∂UI
v jI (UI,pi)+ v
j
I (UI,pi)F
′ (b¯)≤ 0, for UI = U˜kE (pi)+ b¯, j,k ∈ {FP,NP} . (B.2)
If the incumbent would set u j (pi) ∈ (0,U˜ iI (pi)) in the absence of entry and entry occurs, all
consumers strictly gain from entry.
Entry occurs as long as the entrant has a non-negative payoff from servicing the consumers
with the highest benefit from switching, those with b = b¯. Thus there is entry for sure if the
highest utility the entrant is willing to offer attracts some consumers even when the incumbent
also offers the highest utility it is willing to offer (that is, if U˜ jI (pi) < U˜
k
E (pi)+ b¯). Otherwise,
there is entry if and only if the incumbent prefers to cede part of the market at the highest utility
the entrant is willing to offer, a condition captured by (B.2), which generalizes (14).
The main economic difference from this more general formulation is that even consumers
who do not switch to an entrant can strictly gain from entry,29 which strengthens the welfare
28These properties are satisfied by the specific functional forms in the main text.
29That is certainly the case if the incumbent is a not-for-profit that offers strictly positive utility in the absence of
entry (that is, uNP (pi)> 0) because then, with all consumers potentially flexible, it is always worth the incumbent
offering at least marginally higher utility to retain some additional consumers. It may not be the case with a
for-profit incumbent who, as in the previous model, sets uFP (pi) = 0. Then the incumbent may prefer to offer
UFPI (UE ,pi) = 0 for some UE even with entry and serve only those consumers with highly negative switching
benefits if the distribution F is such that there are sufficient of these. Formally, the difference between u j (pi)> 0
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results. This is because competition may lead the incumbent to offer higher utility to retain
additional consumers.
For the model of the main text, the probability of entry by a for-profit provider is lower with
a not-for-profit incumbent than with a for-profit incumbent. The next result gives a general
condition for any parameter change to reduce the probability of entry in the generalized model.
Proposition 9 For j,k ∈ {FP,NP}, consider an equilibrium that, conditional on entry, has UE
such that U jI (UE ,pi)∈ (0,U˜ jI (pi)). A change in any parameter in pi that increases
∂v jI(U˜
k
E(pi)+b¯,pi)/∂U
v jI(U˜
k
E(pi)+b¯,pi)
but does not affect vkE (UE ,pi) reduces the probability of entry.
This proposition shows that the finding that entry is less likely with a not-for-profit incum-
bent than with a for-profit one extends beyond the particular formulation in the main text. There
are two potential channels at work here. The first is a cost channel: a not-for-profit incumbent
that provides a positive (instead of a zero) level of some unobserved quality can deliver given
utility at lower cost even with the same (strictly convex) cost function. That results in an in-
crease in optimal UI for given UE . With vkE (UE ,pi) unaffected, this increases the critical value
of θE at which entry becomes worthwhile and hence, for a given distribution of θE , reduces
the probability of entry. The second is a payoff channel which depends on how a change in
parameter that affects preferences changes the incentive of an incumbent to offer a particular
level of U .30
It is also instructive to see how the result on encouraging or discouraging entry in Propo-
sition 7 is changed in the more general formulation of this section. To generalize the welfare
criterion in (18), it is helpful to define the parameter vector pˆi as the parameter vector pi ex-
cluding the efficiency parameter of the potential entrant θE and the payment to the entrant pE .
and u j (pi) = 0 is that the former is an interior solution at which a marginally higher utility always attracts more
consumers when entry occurs, whereas the latter is a corner solution.
30The following example illustrates the payoff channel at work. Suppose the not-for-profit incumbent has
payoff function αU(q,pi)+Π(q,pi), whereΠ(q,pi) is its profit and α > 0, and let q(U,pi) denote the incumbent’s
optimal choice of quality vector to deliver utility U given the constraints it faces. Then
v jI (U,pi) = αU (q(U,pi))+Π(q(U,pi) ,pi) .
This reduces to the for-profit payoff function vFPI (U,pi) for α = 0. Since α affects profit only through the choice of
q, it follows from the envelope theorem that ∂v jI (U,pi)/∂α =U (q(U,pi))> 0, and hence ∂
2v jI (U,pi)/∂U∂α = 1,
even if there were no change in unobservable qualities. Moreover, for any best response, v jI (U,pi) is non-increasing
in U . Straightforward differentiation then establishes that ∂v
j
I (U,pi)/∂U
v jI (U,pi)
is increasing in α as long as U < U˜ jI (pi).
That also results in an increase in optimal UI for given UE . With vkE (UE ,pi) unaffected, this increases the critical
efficiency level at which entry becomes worthwhile. Thus an increase in α from zero (which corresponds to
moving from a for-profit incumbent to a not-for-profit incumbent) reduces the probability of entry.
37
That is, pˆi = pi\(θE , pE). For consistency with the earlier model, the entrant’s cost of supplying
quality is decreasing in θE . Then, with ̂used to specify equilibrium values conditional on the
parameters, the welfare criterion given incumbent type j and potential entrant type k is
G
(
θˆE (pE , pˆi)
)
u j (pˆi)−ξ pI +
∫ θ¯
θˆE(pE ,pˆi)
{
F
(
bˆ(θE , pE , pˆi)
)
Uˆ jI (θE , pE , pˆi)
+
∫ b¯
bˆ(θE ,pE ,pˆi)
[
UˆkE (θE , pE , pˆi)+b−ξ (pE − pI)
]
dF (b)
}
dG(θE) , (B.3)
where θˆE(pE , pˆi) denotes the entrant efficiency at which entry becomes just worthwhile and
bˆ(θE , pE , pˆi) = Uˆ jI ((θE , pE , pˆi))− UˆkE (θE , pE , pˆi). The following result is the counterpart to
Proposition 7.
Proposition 10 Suppose, for j,k ∈ {FP,NP}, a type j incumbent competes with a type k po-
tential entrant and θˆE(pE , pˆi) < θ¯ at pE = pI . Then a policy-maker increases welfare by en-
couraging entry by increasing pE above pI if
−
[
UˆkE
(
θˆE (pE , pˆi) , pE , pˆi
)
+F
(
bˆ
(
θˆE (pE , pˆi) , pE , pˆi
))
bˆ
(
θˆE (pE , pˆi) , pE , pˆi
)
+
∫ b¯
bˆ(θˆE(pE ,pˆi),pE ,pˆi)
bF ′ (b)db−u j (pˆi)
]
g
(
θˆE (pE , pˆi)
) ∂ θˆE (pE , pˆi)
∂ pE
+
∫ θ¯
θˆE(pE ,pˆi)
{
∂UˆkE (θE , pE , pˆi)
∂ pE
+F
(
bˆ(θE , pE , pˆi)
) ∂ bˆ(θE , pE , pˆi)
∂ pE
−[1−F (bˆ(θE , pE , pˆi))]ξ }dG(θE)> 0 (B.4)
and discouraging it if the strict inequality is reversed.
The term in the first square brackets in (B.4) is the utility gain to those consumers who
would have switched to an entrant with cost parameter θˆ from having entry occur at a marginally
lower cost parameter as the result of the marginal increase in the payment to the entrant. Un-
like in the simple model, it involves an integral term because those consumers switching to
the entrant differ in their benefit from doing so. The lower two lines of (B.4) incorporate the
welfare effect of the change in the proportion of consumers who switch to the entrant because
the payment to the entrant affects the utility the entrant offers those who switch. This second
effect does not arise in the simple model because there the proportion of consumers who switch
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is fixed. This second effect complicates evaluation of having different payments for the entrant
and the incumbent. But the essential point, in line with the simpler model above, is that there
is no more reason to presume that it is optimal to set the same payment for both incumbent and
entrant when all consumers are potentially flexible than when only a fixed proportion are.
Overall, the results in this appendix confirm that a range of insights generated by the simple
model are indeed robust to having a continuous benefit from switching and arbitrary dimensions
of quality. It should also be clear that we do not need to stick to the specific way that we
modeled not-for-profit preferences for the core results to hold as long as they satisfy the key
assumptions outlined here.
B.2 Proofs for Generalized Model
Lemma 1 A type j incumbent’s best response to an entrant offering UE that attracts some
consumers is the unique U jI (UE ,pi) that satisfies
F
(
b∗
(
U jI (UE ,pi) ,UE
)) ∂
∂UI
v jI
(
U jI (UE ,pi) ,pi
)
+ v jI
(
U jI (UE ,pi) ,pi
)
F ′
(
b∗
(
U jI (UE ,pi) ,UE
))
= 0 (B.5)
or, equivalently,
−
∂v jI
(
U jI (UE ,pi) ,pi
)
/∂UI
v jI
(
U jI (UE ,pi) ,pi
) = F ′
(
b∗
(
U jI (UE ,pi) ,UE
))
F
(
b∗
(
U jI (UE ,pi) ,UE
)) . (B.6)
Proof. A type j incumbent’s best response to an entrant offering UE is U
j
I (UE ,pi) that satisfies
U jI (UE ,pi) ∈ argmaxUI v
j
I (UI,pi)F (b
∗ (UI,UE)) . (B.7)
The first-order necessary condition for this best response to be interior (that is, with UI ∈(
0,U˜ iI (pi)
)
such that b∗ (UI,UE) ∈
(
b, b¯
)
) is (B.5) because, from (B.1), ∂b∗ (UI,UE)/∂UI = 1
for b∗ (UI,UE) ∈
(
b, b¯
)
. Moreover, (B.5) can be written as (B.6). With v jI (U,pi) non-negative
and strictly concave in U in the relevant range, the left-hand side of (B.6) is strictly increasing
in UI . With F log concave, F ′/F is non-increasing, so the right-hand side of (B.6) is non-
increasing in UI since ∂b∗ (UI,UE)/∂UI = 1 at any interior solution from (B.1). There can,
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therefore, be at most one solution to (B.5) with UI ∈
(
0,U˜ iI (pi)
)
such that b∗ (UI,UE) ∈
(
b, b¯
)
and hence, by continuity, at most one U jI (UE ,pi) that satisfies (B.7) with b
∗ (UI,UE) ∈
(
b, b¯
)
.
By assumption, b is sufficiently low that the incumbent always chooses to retain some con-
sumers, so UI such that b∗ (UI,UE) = b cannot be a best response and b∗ (UI,UE) = b¯ corre-
sponds to no entry. Thus there is at most one U jI (UE ,pi) that satisfies (B.7) for given UE at
which entry can occur and this satisfies (B.5) and (B.6).
Proof of Proposition 8 With constant returns to scale, the potential entrant enters if and
only if it can attract at least the consumers with the largest benefit from switching b¯. The proof
considers separately the sufficient conditions for entry, the necessary condition for entry, and
consumer utility conditional on entry as specified in the proposition.
Sufficient conditions for entry: If U˜ jI (pi) < U˜
k
E (pi)+ b¯, the potential entrant is prepared
to offer a higher payoff to type b¯ consumers than the incumbent is prepared to offer them, so
entry is worthwhile. For U˜ jI (pi) ≥ U˜kE (pi)+ b¯, suppose (B.2) holds. From Lemma 1, there is
at most one solution to (B.5) so the incumbent would not increase its payoff by offering more
than U˜kE (pi)+ b¯ to retain the consumers with the greatest benefit from switching to the entrant.
The entrant would be prepared to offer U˜kE (pi) to attract those consumers.
Necessary condition for entry: Suppose (B.2) does not hold. Then, even if the entrant
offers the highest consumer payoff it is prepared to offer to attract the consumers, U˜kE (pi), the
incumbent’s payoff is increasing in UI at the value that retains even the consumers with the
greatest benefit from switching b¯. Moreover, with at most one solution to (B.5), the incumbent
would obtain a lower payoff by offering any lower UI .
Consumer utility conditional on entry: In the absence of entry, a type j incumbent
chooses UI to satisfy (B.7) given b∗ (UI,UE) = b¯ so F (b∗ (UI,UE)) = 1 for all UI ≥ 0. By
definition, the solution to that is u j (pi), the payoff to all consumers in the absence of entry.
If u j (pi) > 0, it must satisfy ∂v jI
(
u j (pi) ,pi
)
/∂UI = 0. Conditional on entry, the second term
on the left-hand side of (B.5) is strictly positive for UI = u j (pi) < U˜ iI (pi), as assumed. With
v jI (U,pi) strictly concave in U , that implies U
j
I (UE ,pi) > u
j (pi). Thus even consumers who
do not switch to the entrant receive strictly higher utility conditional on entry as, a fortiori, do
those who choose to switch to the entrant.
Proof of Proposition 9 By assumption, b is sufficiently low that the incumbent always chooses
to retain some consumers, so UI such that b∗ (UI,UE) = b cannot be a best response and
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b∗ (UI,UE) = b¯ corresponds to no entry. Thus, conditional on entry, the incumbent’s best
response U jI (UE ,pi) to UE such that U
j
I (UE ,pi) ∈
(
0,U˜ jI (pi)
)
is, from Lemma 1, given by
the unique solution to (B.6). A change in any parameter in pi that increases ∂v
j
I (U,pi)/∂U
v jI (U,pi)
for
all U ∈ (0,U˜ jI (pi)) reduces the left-hand side of (B.6) for all U ∈ (0,U˜ jI (pi)), which implies an
increase in optimal UI for given UE . But an increase in optimal UI for given UE with vkE (UE ,pi)
unaffected increases the critical value of θE at which entry becomes worthwhile and hence, for
a given distribution of θE , reduces the probability of entry.
Proof of Proposition 10 Substitution for Uˆ jI (θE , pE , pˆi) in (B.3) with the use of bˆ(θE , pE , pˆi)=
UˆkE (θE , pE , pˆi)−Uˆ jI (θE , pE , pˆi) and differentiation with respect to pE , with pE set equal to pI ,
yields the left-hand side of (B.3). If this is strictly positive, welfare is increased by raising pE
above pI . If it is strictly negative, welfare is increased by reducing pE below pI , as claimed in
the proposition.
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